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ESSAY 
 
 
Maritime Emissions Taxation: 
An Alternative to the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme? 
JON M. TRUBY* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the eighteenth session of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
Conference of the Parties (COP18)1 internationalized a new sense 
of urgency2 towards preventing the planet from spiraling towards 
an unsustainable rise in global temperatures, with an emphasis 
that states must simply do more than fulfill their existing 
obligations.3  Prior to the summit, the European Union (EU) 
raised the issue of maritime greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
 
*Dr. Jon Truby, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Environmental Law & 
Policy at the College of Law, Qatar University. 
 1. What is COP?, COP18, http://www.cop18.qa/en-us/aboutcop18cmp8/ 
cop18cmp8.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).  The 18th session of the Conference 
of the Parties to the UNFCCC and the 8th session of the Meeting of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol, to review the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and 
take decisions to promote its effective implementation, took place from Nov. 26, 
2012 to Dec. 7, 2012 in Doha, Qatar. 
 2. See generally THE WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4°C 
WARMER WORLD MUST BE AVOIDED (2012), available at http:// 
climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4
_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf (warning that the 
world must take greater measures than currently agreed, in order to avoid a 4°C 
rise in global temperatures). 
 3. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Climate Action: Questions and Answers on 
the UN Climate Conference in Doha No. 12/888 (Nov. 23 2012), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-888_en.htm (stressing the 
importance of entering new binding commitments to reduce GHGs). 
1
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where an absence of any binding international agreement meant 
that the shipping industry was not privy to the same emissions 
reduction imperatives4 as other sectors.5 
Having previously bound itself to reducing emissions,6 the 
EU proposed including GHG emissions from the maritime 
transportation sector in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS),7 but also raised alternative options for internal measures 
including the imposition of an emissions tax.8  Such action from 
the EU could have far-reaching implications for the rest of the 
world,9 potentially instigating other states to take any number of 
possible actions.10  These actions may include objecting to such a 
 
 4. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) considered the maritime 
transport sector to be ‘undercharged’ (in terms of their fuel). INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL AVIATION AND SHIPPING 
AS A SOURCE OF CLIMATE FINANCE 5 (2011), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/g20/pdf/110411a.pdf. 
 5. See Press Release, Council of the EU, Conclusions on the Preparations for 
the 18th Session of COP 18 to the UNFCCC and the 8th Session of the Meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Doha, Qatar, Nov. 26 - Dec. 7, 2012) 3194th 
Environment Council Meeting, Luxembourg 6 (Oct. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/13322
7.pdf. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 14-22. 
 7. Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009 Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the Community, 2009 
O.J. (L 140) 63, 63 [hereinafter Directive 2009/29/EC], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:en:pdf. 
 8. EUR. COMM’N, ROADMAP: MEASURES TO INCLUDE MARITIME TRANSPORT 
EMISSIONS IN THE EU'S GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION COMMITMENT IF NO 
INTERNATIONAL RULES AGREED 2 (2011) [hereinafter ROADMAP], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2012_clima_001_ 
maritime_transport_emissions_en.pdf. 
 9. Benefits of Trade Liberalisation: Trade Costs, OECD, http:// 
www.oecd.org/tad/benefitlib/trade-costs.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (noting 
that as of 2007, 90% of global trade by volume is carried by ship); JASPER FABER 
ET AL., TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN ACTION TO REDUCING GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRANSPORT 11 (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/shipping/docs/ghg_ships_ 
report_en.pdf (noting approximately one third of world shipping emissions 
stemmed from voyages arriving at or departing from EU ports). 
 10. M.E. DAVIES ET AL., BMT MURRAY FENTON EDON LIDDIARD VINCE LTD., 
STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC, LEGAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF A EUROPEAN UNION SYSTEM TO REDUCE SHIP EMISSIONS OF SO2 AND NOX: FINAL 
REPORT FOR EUROPEAN COMMISSION CONTRACT 25 (2000), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/taxation/ship_emissions/pdf/ 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/4
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scheme, seeking instead to capitalize by attracting new shipping 
registrations through carbon leakage;11 seeking an international 
agreement to avoid unilateral action by one legislature; or taking 
similar measures themselves rather than risk losing important 
revenues.12 
Focusing on the EU’s alternative proposal of an emissions 
tax, this article analyzes the possibility for the imposition by an 
EU Member State of a targeted environmental tax to reduce 
maritime emissions.  It considers how such a tax can be imposed 
in a manner that will not be detrimental to commercial interests 
and can instigate the desired impact.13  Importantly, it focuses 
upon providing a greater incentive for the maritime industry to 
invest in the most efficient shipping fleet to reduce emissions.  It 
concludes by comparing whether such a perceived maritime 
emissions tax could be more advantageous than including 
maritime emissions in the EU ETS. 
 
mainfinal.pdf (noting approximately half of the world’s ships gross registered at 
250 tons or more are estimated to operate in European waters). 
 11. The European Commission defines carbon leakage as the term often 
used to describe the situation that may occur if, for reasons of costs 
related to climate policies, businesses were to transfer production to 
other countries which have laxer constraints on greenhouse gas 
emissions. This could lead to an increase in their total emissions. 
The risk of carbon leakage may be higher in certain energy-intensive 
industries. 
Climate Action, Carbon Leakage, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/ 
policies/ets/cap/leakage/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).  See also 
Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon 
Leakage, 65 J. INT’L ECON. 421, 422 (2005) (explaining how some developing 
countries may be willing to relax carbon emissions rules to attract relocating 
companies). 
 12. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 4, at 38 (calculating revenues from 
international maritime fuels). 
 13. Directive 2009/29/EC, supra note 7, at 63 (This is also in line with the 
stated intention of the EU in selecting from the various legal instruments 
available, with its Directive stating that any “proposal should [minimize] any 
negative impact on the Community’s competitiveness while taking into account 
the potential environmental benefits.”). 
3
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II. BACKGROUND: EU LAW 
The EU’s 20-20-20 policy, for decreasing emissions across the 
Union from 1990 levels by at least 20% by 2020,14 imposed a 
deadline of December 31, 2011 to reach an international 
agreement through the UNFCCC15 or through the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO),16 incorporating maritime 
emissions reductions targets.  While the EU envisioned progress 
at COP18 towards an international agreement,17 it was conscious 
that neither the Kyoto Protocol18 nor the Copenhagen Accord had 
enabled a binding commitment to reduce maritime emissions.19  
Since the deadline passed without the required international 
agreement, the European Commission (EC) was compelled to 
propose a new Community law requiring maritime emissions 
reductions targets, with an aim of it coming into force by 2013.20  
 
 14. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: 20 20 by 2020: Europe's Climate Change Opportunity, at 2, COM (2008) 
30 final (Jan. 23, 2008). 
 15. See Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate 
Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Oct. 17, 
2013) (noting “the question of what happens beyond 2020 was answered by 
Parties in Durban (2011)”). 
 16. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
Maritime Transport and Amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013, at 10, COM 
(2013) 480 final (June 28, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/ 
impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2013/com_2013_0480_en.pdf. 
 17. See Doha Conference Must Lay the Foundations for the 2015 Global 
Climate Deal, EUR. COMM’N (Nov. 23, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/ 
articles/news_2012112301_en.htm. 
 18. A binding treaty with obligations for states to stabilize their GHG 
emissions. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (Article 2.2 simply calls upon 
Annex 1 parties to work through the IMO to “pursue limitation or reduction of 
emissions of greenhouse gases . . . from . . . marine bunker fuels. . . .”). 
 19. See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Conference of the Parties, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, Decisions 
Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 
2010), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/ eng/11a01.pdf (No 
mention of maritime emissions was made in the Copenhagen Accord.). 
 20. Directive 2009/29/EC, supra note 7 at 63.  See also Decision 406/2009/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Effort of 
Member States to Reduce Their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/4
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One of the four legal instruments proposed as options to achieve 
this goal was a maritime emissions tax21 with hypothecated 
revenues.22  Before considering how such a tax could effectively 
be designed, it is first necessary to summarize why change is 
required. 
III.  NEED FOR CHANGE 
Aside from fuel costs, the status quo provides little incentive 
for the maritime industry to shift to a lower emissions model of 
transportation.23  Continued failure to account for the negative 
externalities24 caused by this sector may fulfill predictions that 
maritime transport emissions will rise further.25  The EU’s 
dictum of requiring the polluter to take financial responsibility 
 
Community’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Commitments Up to 2020, 
2009 O.J. (L 140) 136, 136, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0136:0148:en:pdf. 
 21. See Public Consultation, Eur. Comm’n, Including Maritime Transport 
Emissions in the EU's Greenhouse Gas Reduction Commitment, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/articles/0014_en.htm (last updated Mar. 
10, 2013) (noticing of the EC public consultation on the issue to be held until 
April 2012). 
 22. See ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT COMMITTEE, THE 2007 PRE-BUDGET REPORT 
AND COMPREHENSIVE SPENDING REVIEW: AN ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS, 2007-8, 
H.C. 149-I, at 8-9 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmenvaud/149/149.pdf (noting that earmarking tax 
revenues for clear environmental purposes helps reach environmental objectives 
while increasing taxpayer support for the charge).  See also ROADMAP, supra 
note 8, at 2. 
 23. See Commission Staff Working Paper Annex to: The Communication on 
Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution and The Directive on “Ambient Air Quality 
and Cleaner Air for Europe” Impact Assessment, at 30, COM (2005) 446 final 
(Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/ 
cafe/pdf/ia_report_en050921_final.pdf (estimating that maritime emissions of 
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide may be as polluting as the combined 
impact of the same land-based pollutants by 2020 if no actions are taken).  See 
also Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment Accompanying the 
Document: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Directive 1999/32/EC as Regards the Sulphur Content of 
Marine Fuels, at 6, COM (2011) 439 final (July 15, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/transport/pdf/ships/sec_2011_918_en.pdf. 
 24. See generally A. C. PIGUO, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912) (arguing for a 
corrective use of taxation so as to internalize negative externalities); but see 
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 33-40 (1960) 
(questioning the use of taxation to internalize externalities); STEVEN N. S. 
CHEUNG, THE MYTH OF SOCIAL COST (3d ed. 1992). 
 25. FABER ET AL., supra note 9, at 11. 
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for its pollution26 can reduce emissions by discouraging27 harmful 
business-as-usual practices28 and instigating a shift towards a 
more environmentally efficient method of transport.29  Without it, 
society is left with the cost for an environmental negativity that, 
without action, will contribute to the world’s progression towards 
a 4°C average rise in temperatures.30 
Nevertheless, this article seeks a solution which does not 
hinder the competitiveness of the maritime sector, but which 
promotes its development in a sustainable fashion.  With the 
shipping industry struggling financially31 and host countries 
unwilling to lose the business of registered vessels which may be 
re-registered in a state with lighter regulations,32 there are stark 
dangers of introducing a measure without clear objectives. 
IV.  SOLUTIONS: REVENUE NEUTRALITY AND 
INCENTIVES 
To avoid these problems, a revenue-neutral tax can be 
subject-friendly, allowing it to promote change without 
necessarily utilizing the maritime sector as a revenue base.  
While collecting taxes from this industry can be fiscally appealing 
 
 26. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, art. 191, § 2, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 132.  The “Polluter-Pays” 
principle is exemplified within the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, which developed a broad understanding of the parties responsible 
for payment. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
de Janiero, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 27. See HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE, 308 (2006) (explaining that, “[p]utting an appropriate price on carbon, 
through taxes [. . .], means that people pay the full social cost of their actions”). 
 28. See generally William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of 
Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1972). 
 29. See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAM, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2012 32 
(2012), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf (emphasizing 
the need for low-carbon alternatives). 
 30. See generally THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2. 
 31. Press Release, Moody’s, Moody’s: Negative Outlook for Global Shipping 
Industry Due to Oversupply and High Oil Prices (May 31, 2012), available at 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Negative-outlook-for-global-shipping-
industry-due-to-oversupply--PR_247207. 
 32. See LLOYD'S REGISTER, COP 15 AND THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.lr.org/Images/LRCOP15shippingbriefJan2010_tcm155-
175436.pdf. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/4
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for policy-makers to raise liquidity for government expenditure, a 
perhaps more prudent solution in this instance is to design such a 
tax without the intention of raising revenues.33  In this way, the 
environmental objective can be met without direct government 
expenditure.  The objective is completed not by direct government 
expenditure, but rather via maritime taxpayer investments in 
low-emissions technology to reduce their overall emissions.34  The 
EC’s proposed tax option in this instance is to have hypothecated 
revenues,35 which means they may retain tax revenues for 
expenditure on environmental projects.36  The proposal herein is 
not to raise revenue for expenditure, but to utilize the revenues to 
offset losses in other taxes—for which the maritime taxpayer is 
seeking to have reduced—following their investment in 
replacement technology.37 
It may be possible to introduce allowable deductions for such 
qualifying investments against, for example, corporation tax or 
tonnage tax.38  While this may decrease a state’s overall tax 
revenue from those charges, it can provide an additional incentive 
for taxpayer compliance with the environmental objective.  With 
either method, the burden of the tax may be borne only by those 
maritime transportation companies who do not make the 
required shift to emissions abatement technology, and instead 
 
 33. See DAVID W. PEARCE, ET. AL., BLUEPRINT FOR A GREEN ECONOMY 164 
(1989) (advocating the utilization of revenue-neutral taxation to avert climate 
change, in order to keep the burden on taxpayers from increasing). 
 34. It is noted that low emissions technology is just one of several methods 
for meeting an environmental objective. 
 35. ROADMAP, supra note 8, at 2. 
 36. See, e.g., Environmental Fund, DEP’T  OF ENV’T, CMTY. & LOCAL GOV’T, 
(2007), http://www.environ.ie/en/Environment/Waste/EnvironmentFund/ (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2013) (describing how net revenues from Ireland’s plastic bag 
levy were hypothecated to Irelands’ Environment Fund, set up pursuant to The 
Waste Management (Amendment) Act 2001). 
 37. See APOLLONIA MIOLA ET AL., EUR. COMM’N, REGULATING AIR EMISSIONS 
FROM SHIPS: THE STATE OF THE ART ON METHODOLOGIES, TECHNOLOGIES AND 
POLICY OPTIONS 27 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/ 
jrc_reference_report_2010_11_ships_emissions.pdf. 
 38. See TTM01010 - Introduction to Tonnage Tax: A Brief Guide, HM 
REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ttmmanual/ 
ttm01010.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (explaining that the United Kingdom’s 
tonnage tax regime “is an alternative method of calculating corporation tax 
profits by reference to the net tonnage of the ship operated”). 
7
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suffer the charge in line with the polluter-pays principle.39  
Revenues charged from such non-complying taxpayers may 
recover some losses in government revenue endured by 
deductions or allowances in corporation or tonnage tax. 
If such budgetary allowances are not affordable in a given 
situation, then instead, an emissions excise or fixed charge could 
be introduced.  This could be offset or reduced via investments in 
low emissions or technology, so that the taxpayer has the option 
to either pay the tax or invest in the technology.  An elementary 
comparison may be drawn with the United Kingdom’s Vehicle 
Excise Duty, which enables motorists to select a low-emissions 
vehicle with the option of a zero annual tax charge, or to select a 
higher-emitting vehicle liable for a higher annual rate of tax.40  
Additionally, by incentivizing investment in more efficient 
maritime technology to reduce emissions, such measures may 
instigate an advanced benefit of increasing investment in 
research and development of new technologies.41  These 
incentives for companies to minimize taxes can instigate the 
development of new technologies, thus helping further the 
environmental gains through possible methods of emissions 
reductions.42  By encouraging emissions abatement measures, 
this type of banding structure is preferable to the United 
 
 39. However depending on elasticity, the maritime transport company may 
be able to pass on the cost to the end user, and therefore final incidence may not 
be borne by those intended. 
 40. Vehicle Excise and Registration Act, 1994, c. 22, sch. 1 (Eng.). 
 41. See HM TREASURY, SUPPORTING GROWTH IN INNOVATION: ENHANCING THE 
R&D TAX CREDIT 21 (2005) (U.K.), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/ 
consult_new/rd-taxcredit.pdf. 
 42. For instance where there are bands of tax deductions similar in concept 
to Vehicle Excise Duty, taxpayers may seek to avoid higher bands by purchasing 
technologies suitable to lower bands.  The U.K.’s Finance Act of 2001 introduced 
the possibility of a zero annual charge, despite there being no vehicles on the 
market at the time with suitably lower emissions to achieve such a charge.  
Nevertheless such vehicles were subsequently introduced onto the market, 
whilst other high emitting vehicle manufacturers produced lower emitting 
vehicles to attract buyers wishing to mitigate their annual charge. See, e.g., 
Range Rover Evoque, LAND ROVER, http://www.landrover.com/us/en/lr/range-
rover-evoque/explore/range-rover-evoque/ (follow “Engine” hyperlink) (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2013) (comparing the lower engine size of the Range Rover 
Evoque with traditional Range Rover models). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/4
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Kingdom’s rudimentary Air Passenger Duty,43 which simply 
charges per distance travelled rather than per emissions, thus 
failing to incentivize a shift in technology.44 
If such measures can be introduced in a manner not designed 
to raise revenue but to encourage required changes, then it may 
enable the intention of protecting commercial interests and 
retaining competitiveness—by not adding to the overall costs of 
maritime transport companies—while achieving the 
environmental objective through incentivizing private sector 
implementation of emissions abatement measures.  There may 
also be further benefits, including possible economic benefits of 
promoting a state’s shipbuilding industry, plus environmental 
and industry cost-saving benefits of reduced fuel costs.  It is 
estimated that $310 billion in fuel costs can be saved by 2030 
with increased fuel-efficient technology resulting from IMO 
measures.45  For policy-makers, the revenue-neutral approach 
can have the attractive option of enabling expenditure-free46 
achievement of environmental positivity.47 
V.  LIMITATIONS 
Having established the basic premise for a revenue-neutral 
tax to promote technological improvements to achieve maritime 
emissions abatements, the possible limitations of introducing 
such a proposed tax are considered and feasible means of 
overcoming them are discussed. 
 
 43. Finance Act, 1994, c. 9, §§ 28-44, sch. 6 (Eng.), available at http:// 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/9/pdfs/ukpga_19940009_en.pdf. 
 44. See Jon M. Truby, Reforming the Air Passenger Duty as an 
Environmental Tax, 12 ENVTL. L. REV. 94, 102 (2010) (U.K.). 
 45. Report Shows Significant Reductions in Shipping’s CO2 Emissions from 
IMO Measures, CARBON POSITIVE, http://www.carbonpositive.net/industry-
updates/339-report-shows-significant-reductions-in-shippings-co2-emissions-
from-imo-measures.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
 46. Magnus S. Eide et al., Future Cost Scenarios for Reduction of Ship CO2 
Emissions, 38 MAR. POL’Y & MGMT. 11, 11 (2011). 
 47. Francisco J. André et al., Performing an Environmental Tax Reform in a 
Regional Economy. A Computable General Equilibrium Approach, 39 ANNALS 
REG’L SCI. 375, 376 (2005) (noting “if a double dividend exists, it is possible to 
improve the environmental quality without any cost in terms of non-
environmental economic welfare”). 
9
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A.  Type of Tax and International Rules 
It is important to distinguish the proposed emission tax48 
from any sort of tax on marine fuel such as an excise tax, which 
would not be permissible, at least for EU Member States.49  A 
vessel emissions tax option raised in an EC report suggests 
taxing “emissions weighted by sea region and distance from 
shore.”50  This approach was found to be the best option in terms 
of environmental and economic efficiencies, though difficulties in 
administering and monitoring such emissions were noted.51  An 
effective design may be in the form of an en-route emissions 
charge on vessels,52 which would provide an incentive to reduce 
the regular level of emissions for each trip, so as to reduce the 
charge. 
Such emissions tax measures however have not been fully 
tested by the courts, and may face legal challenges pursuant to 
the right to innocent passage of foreign vessels53 under the 
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
agreement.54  Article 26 prohibits charges levied on foreign ships 
 
 48. Defined as “payments on direct releases into the environment, based on 
pollutant characteristics and on the quantity of discharges.” MARKET-BASED 
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS 4 
(Mikael  Andersen & Rolf-Ulrich Sprenger eds., 2000). 
 49. Directive 92/81/EEC of the European Council of 19 October 1992 on the 
Harmonization of the Structures of Excise Duties on Mineral Oils, 1992 O.J. (L 
316) 12, 14, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri 
=OJ:L:1992:316:0012:0015:EN:PDF (prohibiting EU Member States from taxing 
marine fuels).  See also Directive 2003/96/EC of the European Council of 27 
October 2003 on Restructuring of the Community Framework for the Taxation 
of Energy Products and Electricity, 2003 O.J. (L 283) 51, 56, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:L:2003:283:0051:0070:en:pdf (prohibiting EU Member States from 
introducing taxes on non-domestic shipping pursuant to Article 14). 
 50. DAVID HARRISON, JR. ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF 
ALTERNATIVE MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE LOW-EMISSION SHIPPING 
IN EUROPEAN UNION SEA AREAS 3 (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/air/pdf/04_nera_report.pdf. 
 51. Id. at 7. 
 52. See id. at 11. 
 53. Id. (explaining Part 2, Section 3, of UNCLOS). 
 54. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ convention_ 
agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/4
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“by reason only of their passage through the territorial sea,”55 but 
permits non-discriminatory charges “as payment only for specific 
services rendered to the ship.”56  Emissions charges are unlikely 
to be classified as services.  Equally, they may not be regarded as 
charges purely for passage through a state’s waters since they are 
for an environmental purpose rather than a charge for the right 
of entry.  Nevertheless, the ambiguity may prevent legislatures 
from enacting a taxation measure that may result in expensive, 
time-consuming, and potentially politically embarrassing legal 
challenges that may be overturned.57 
B. Leakage 
A further legitimate reason for not implementing marine fuel 
excise taxes is to mitigate the risk of leakage, whereby maritime 
transporters switch fuelling purchases to retailers in non-taxing 
jurisdictions.58  This example exerts caution to the present, 
similar situation of implementing maritime emissions taxation 
where it is important to avoid causing tax leakage, whereby 
maritime transportation companies avoid such a tax by re-
registering in non-charging or low rate jurisdictions and thus 
providing less-environmentally proactive states with an economic 
benefit of added business.59  Lloyd’s Register emphasizes the 
simplicity by which vessels can re-flag to other states, mainly to 
developing countries.60  Re-registration may allow the avoidance 
 
 55. Id. at art. 26(1). 
 56. Id. at art. 26(2). 
 57. Nigeria’s gross tonnage levy, pursuant to Marine Environment 
Management (Sea Protection Levy) Regulation, treats foreign-flagged vessels 
differently from Nigerian-flagged vessels, and poses a risk of being challenged 
under UNCLOS Part II, Section 3, Article 26(2). See Shipping & Transport – 
Nigeria: New Marine Environment (Sea Protection) Levy for Ships, INT’L L. 
OFFICE (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/ 
detail.aspx?g=c0fc3aec-4f10-4d56-86dc-f025d12da09f. 
 58. See generally Piet Rietveld et al., Spatial Graduation of Fuel Taxes; 
Consequences for Cross-Border and Domestic Fuelling, 35 TRANSP. RES. 433 
(2001). 
 59. Jon M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental 
Tax Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Countries, 
12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 164-65 (2010); see Directive 2009/29/EC supra note 7, at 
8. 
 60. LLOYD'S REGISTER BRIEFING, supra note 32, at 1. 
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of national shipping regulations, charges, or taxes.61  This risk is 
highlighted by the EC, which emphasizes that “Member States at 
individual level have been reluctant to develop legislation to 
reduce emissions in this area as it may lead to reduced business 
for their ports without a corresponding increase in environmental 
integrity.”62  The significant danger of such leakage, to avoid any 
maritime emissions taxation, reinforces the justification for a 
revenue-neutral tax model that can be attractive for companies to 
participate in, and the need for a multi-lateral effort to solve this 
so that a state does not lose out economically through unilateral 
measures.63 
One potential means of overcoming competitiveness concerns 
is to utilize border tax adjustments upon imports from states not 
introducing similar environmental measures.  However, in 
addition to the complexity of its administration and potential 
harm to world trade,64 in the case of shipping, this—depending on 
the bargaining strength of the state—may neither bring 
worthwhile financial return nor encourage states enjoying the 
benefits of increased port action to introduce similar 
environmental measures.65 
C.  State Aid 
Finally, the proposed revenue-neutral model, which 
encourages investments in sustainable marine transportation 
technology, may be deemed to favor a shipbuilding nation by 
offering such goods or services, and be regarded as a form of state 
 
 61. See generally Ronald Becerra Rodríguez, Flags of Convenience Regulation 
within the European Union and its Future on International Trade, 11 REVISTA 
REPUBLICANA 15, 16 (2011). 
 62. ROADMAP supra note 8, at 2. 
 63. See Anna Mellin & Hanna Rydhed, Swedish Ports’ Attitudes Towards 
Regulations of the Shipping Sector's Emissions of CO2, 38 MAR. POL’Y & MGMT. 
437, 441 (2011) (Swed.). 
 64. See Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of A Carbon Tax, 33 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 551 (2009). 
 65. PER KÅGESON ET AL., MARKET BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR ABATEMENT OF 
EMISSIONS FROM SHIPPING: A PILOT PROJECT FOR THE BALTIC SEA 81 (Katharina 
Koppe & Falk Heinen eds., 2008), available at http://www.isl.org/sites/default/ 
files/projects/mbi/3852.pdf (noting that in the similar situation of port charges, 
“the fairway dues are in most cases not large enough to allow for an 
environmental differentiation that reflects the difference in emissions among 
ships”). 
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aid.  EU rules66 on state aid do allow some incentives for 
environmentally efficient ship models, but the risk of a legal 
challenge remains.67 
VI.  EU ETS 
While the scope of the EU market means that a Union-wide 
measure could have a considerable impact within the Union and 
be influential outside of it, the EU is actually limited in its 
options to introduce a measure that can have the desired impact 
and be legitimate.68  Despite the feasible impact of a possible 
maritime emissions tax as discussed, the sovereignty of each 
Member State over its own tax affairs prevents the EU from 
introducing EU-wide taxes.69  Thus, the EU ETS has been a 
carefully contemplated market-based measure, designed in part 
to avoid the illegitimacy of being an EU imposed tax, and has 
successfully defeated legal challenges to prove that it is not an 
illegal charge under international law.70  Though the comparative 
efficiencies are not considered herein, its ability to incentivize 
change in a similar manner as a revenue-neutral tax discussed 
are not doubted.71 
 
 66. See generally Commission Communication C(2004) 43 Community 
Guidelines on State Aid to Maritime Transport, 2004 O.J. (C 13) 3, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2004:013:0003:0012:en:pdf. 
 67. See Iliana Christodoulou-Varotsi, A Maritime Competition Reading of 
Regulation 1408/71/EC on the Co-ordination of Social Security Systems in the 
European Union: Is the Current Regime Out-of-Date?, in COMPETITION AND 
REGULATION IN SHIPPING AND SHIPPING RELATED INDUSTRIES 207, 219-20 
(Antōnios M. Antapasis, Lia I. Athanassiou, & Erik Røsæg eds., 2009); MARK 
CLOUGH & FERGUS RANDOLPH, SHIPPING AND EC COMPETITION LAW 284-85 (1991). 
 68. See generally Henrik Ringbom, Global Problem—Regional Solution? 
International Law Reflections on an EU CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme for 
Ships, 26 INT’L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 613 (2011) (explaining ETS and 
discussing options). 
 69. See MATHIEU ISENBAERT, EC LAW AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE MEMBER 
STATES IN DIRECT TAXATION 452 (2010). 
 70. See Jon Truby, Extraterritoriality or an Illegal Tax? A Challenge to the 
Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 14 ENVTL. L. REV. 
301, 305 (2012) (U.K.). 
 71. Markus Lederer, Market Making Via Regulation: The Role of the State in 
Carbon Markets, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 524, 529 (2012); see generally Mustafa 
Babiker et al., Is International Emissions Trading Always Beneficial?, 25 
ENERGY J. 33 (2004). 
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The attraction of a maritime emissions tax fades against this 
option, since it faces risks of legal challenges, leakage, and 
competitive disadvantages.  Further, since only individual states 
are empowered to enact tax measures, it lacks the same 
influential impact for environmental improvement as a tax made 
by the EU at Union level.  The EU ETS’ ability to initiate this 
environmental change in the entire EU would be a game-changer, 
for the maritime emissions of EU registered ships as well as any 
such ships utilizing EU waters.72 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Consequently, the inclusion of maritime transportation 
emissions in the EU ETS remains a more attractive option as 
opposed to a maritime emissions tax.73  With reduced complexity 
and fewer potential legal challenges, the framework for the EU 
ETS already exists, and the transition to include maritime 
emissions would thus be relatively straightforward and can be 
enacted centrally rather than locally.  The EU has already 
experimented with this preferred option with air transport, 
having legally defeated the same extraterritoriality arguments 
from non-EU states that the inclusion of maritime emissions in 
the EU ETS would face.74  Though it faced external political 
 
 72. Despite winning a lengthy legal battle to prove that the inclusion of 
aviation in the EU ETS was not contrary to international law, the EU has 
proposed the temporary suspension of the inclusion of non-EU aircraft into the 
EU ETS, pending an international agreement on the matter by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation. Proposal for a Decision of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Derogating Temporarily from Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a 
Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community, 
at 3, COM (2012), 697 final (Nov. 20, 2011). 
 73. There also remains the unexplored option of utilising border tax 
adjustments as mentioned above to support tax measures, to support any 
reduction of competitiveness caused by the EU ETS. See generally Ronald Ismer 
& Karsten Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way to Support 
Stringent Emission Trading, 24 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 137 (2007); Javier de Cendra, 
Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An 
Analysis vis-à-vis WTO Law, 15 REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 131 (2006). 
 74. See Jon Truby, Extraterritoriality or an Illegal Tax? A Challenge to the 
Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 14 ENVTL. L. REV. 
301, 305 (2012) (U.K.). 
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pressure to end the scheme,75 the inclusion of both EU and non-
EU airlines in the EU ETS, provided sufficient global pressure to 
ensure that the International Civil Aviation Organization 
eventually agreed to implement—by 2020—a new global market-
based mechanism to aviation emissions—a major success for the 
EU following decades of inaction by the organization.76  Thus the 
global political implications of including maritime emissions in 
the EU ETS could be far wider reaching than just the EU, 
potentially ensuring the issue is taken seriously at a global scale. 
 
 
 75. Barbara Lewis & Valerie Volcovici, Insight: U.S., China Turned EU 
Powers Against Airline Pollution Law, REUTERS, (Dec. 10, 2012, 7:08 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/10/us-eu-airlines-climate-
idUSBRE8B801H20121210. 
 76. Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Assembly—Thirty-Eighth Session Report 
of the Executive Committee on Agenda Item 17 (Section on Climate Change) at 
17-6, ICAO Doc. A38-WP/430 (Mar. 10, 2013), available at http://www.icao.int/ 
Meetings/a38/Documents/WP/wp430_en.pdf; see Reducing Emissions from 
Aviation: Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS, EUR. COMM’N, (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/. 
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